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Abstract
The poor business environment mainly poor infrastructure is found to has paramount
importance in explaining Africa's disadvantage relative to other similar countries.
To cope with this poor supply of electricity, ﬁrms adopt diﬀerent mechanisms to
reduce the resulting eﬀects. The commonly adopted coping strategy is investment
in self-generation of electricity. This study examined the role of investing in self-
generation in mitigating the outage loss and evaluated the outage loss diﬀerential
between ﬁrms that invested in self-generation and those that did not using World
Bank Enterprise Survey data collected from ﬁrms operating in 13 Sub-Saharan
African countries. The result obtained shows that, though self-generation has re-
duced the amount of outage loss for ﬁrms that invested in self-generation, these
ﬁrms continue to face higher unmitigated outage loss compared to ﬁrms without
such investment. In spite of this, ﬁrms that invested in self-generation would have
incurred 36%-99% more than the current amount of outage loss if they do not
engaged in self-generation. Similarly, ﬁrms that did not invest in self-generation
would have reduced their outage loss by 2% - 24% if they had engaged in self
generation. The study thus, recommended a diﬀerential supply interruption to
be followed by public authorities based on ﬁrms' degree of vulnerability to power
interruptions.
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1 Introduction
The business environment in which a ﬁrm operates encompassing features of
legal and regulatory services, infrastructures, ﬁnancial and institutional systems
of the country has an important impact on ﬁrm performance. These business
environments also called `investment climate' varies across regions and countries.
For this matter, empirical studies aimed at investigating the impact of business
climate on ﬁrm outcomes proceed both at a ﬁrm and country level.
A poor business environment mainly poor infrastructure is found to has paramount
importance in explaining Africa's disadvantage relative to other similar countries.
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Cross country empirical works, for instance, (Iacovone et al., 2014; Harrison et al.,
2014) shows that African ﬁrms lead in productivity levels and growth when con-
trolling for the political and business environments. However, without considering
these factors, African ﬁrms were found to have a signiﬁcant disadvantages across
all performance measures. This indicates that Africa's disadvantages arise from
its weak business environment.
Poor business environment is associated with poor investment, employment and
growth. Recent empirical studies on Sub-Saharan (SSA), (Iacovone et al., 2014;
Scott et al., 2014; Cissokho and Seck, 2013), show that poor infrastructure mainly
poor supply of electricity is negatively related to ﬁrm productivity, eﬃciency and
growth1. This poor quality of electricity service can drive up ﬁrms' cost of pro-
duction2 and bias their technological choices.
To cope with this poor supply of electricity, ﬁrms adopt diﬀerent mechanisms to
reduce the resulting eﬀects. The commonly adopted coping strategy is investment
in self-generation of electricity. The decision to invest in self-generation depends on
not only reliability power supply but also other ﬁrm characteristics such as industry
type, ﬁrm's power intensity level, and other ﬁrm characteristics (Steinbuks and
Foster, 2010; Oseni and Pollitt, 2015; Adenikinju, 2003). Firms facing the same
outage time may have diﬀerent incentive to invest in self-generation due to a
diﬀerence in their degree of vulnerability to power outages. Referring to the sample
of ﬁrms used in this study, 76% of ﬁrms in Senegal own generator which is greater
than the percentage of ﬁrms owning generator in Ghana (53%) where power
problem is severe compared to that of Senegal ( see Figure 3.1). This is a possible
explanation why ﬁrm's incentive to invest in self-generation depends not only on
the duration of outage but also on the power intensity level of a ﬁrm's business
activities.
Investment in self-generation, however, does not guarantee a complete mitigation
of outages (Beenstock et al., 1997). A ﬁrm may investment in self-generation
and still continues to face unmitigated outage loss. The data used in this study
described in (Figures 3.1) also reveals that in Nigeria, where about 86% of ﬁrms
own generator, ﬁrms still suﬀer outage loss of 12%. In this regard, this study asks:
Does investment in self-generation help ﬁrms in mitigating outage loss and what
is the outage loss diﬀerential between ﬁrms that invested in self-generation and
those that did not?
1see also Steinbuks and Foster (2010); Nyanzu and Adarkwah (2016); Oseni and Pollitt (2015);
Adenikinju (2003)
2see Fisher-Vanden et al. (2015)
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There is a limited literature with a objective of answering the above questions i.e.
the role of investment in self-generation in mitigating outage loss. In this regard,
Pasha et al. (1989) showed that investment in self-generation reduces the reported
cost of power outages in industrial sector of Pakistan but it is impossible to infer
outage cost diﬀerential between ﬁrms that invested in self-generation and those
that did not from their result. Steinbuks and Foster (2010) compared the cost and
beneﬁts of owning generator for Sub-Saharan African ﬁrms, however, they did not
consider the role of investing in self-generation in mitigating outage loss. Oseni
and Pollitt (2015), a study more close to the current study, examined outage loss
diﬀerential between ﬁrms that engaged in self-generation and those that did not
using a switching regression.
However, the switching regression utilized by Oseni and Pollitt (2015) is based
on exogeneity assumption of power outages and hence the independence between
ﬁrm's decision to invest in self-generation and the corresponding outage loss that
ﬁrms face. However, this assumption may result in selectivity bias. The selectiv-
ity bias arises because of the correlation between the outage loss that a ﬁrm face
and the decision to invest in self-generation. Ignoring this correlation results in
a biased estimates (Maddala, 1993). The endogenous switching regression over-
comes this problem because the decision to invest in self-generation is treated to
be endogenous. Thus, this study uses endogenous switching regression in a coun-
terfactual framework to examine the role of self-generation in mitigating outage
loss and examine outage loss diﬀerential among SSA ﬁrms.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows: The following section
provides a conceptual framework and research hypothesis. Section 3 presents data
source and describes the estimation strategies and the empirical model. Section 4
presents empirical results; while the ﬁnal section provides conclusions and policy
implications drawn from the study.
2 Theoretical Model of Firm's Investment in Self-
Generation
Firm's decision to invest in self-generation, like other investment decision, depends
on several factors including ﬁnancial capacity and internal ﬁrm decision process.
Since the availability and quality of public electricity are uncertain, a risk-neutral
ﬁrm decides whether to invest in a generator of size, Gi > 0. A ﬁrm incurs a
ﬁxed cost k for installing a generator and a running cost of µGi per hour, which
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is mainly a fuel cost. A ﬁrm that has installed an electric generator can ensure a
return of ϕGi, where ϕ > 0 is a generator's productivity.
In a NPV approach to investment decision, all capital costs have to be weighed
against the expected of future beneﬁts and a ﬁrm undertakes an investment with
a positive NPV (DeCanio and Watkins, 1998). A ﬁrm that invests in a self-
generation gets a beneﬁt of a reduced outage loss that the ﬁrm would have incurred
in the absence of such investment. Given the above information, the ﬁrm that
invested in a private generator can reduce the outage loss 3 by λHQ − ϕHGi,
where Q is the total annual sales of the ﬁrm in USD, λ is a measure of the degree
of vulnerability of the ﬁrm's operation to power outages, 0 < λ ≤ 1 4 and H is
total outage time in a year 5. Thus, based on the given cost and beneﬁt of investing
in self-generation, the NPV can be determined by:
NPV =
T∑
t=1
1
(1 + r)t
{(λHQ− ϕHGi)− CGt [µGi, k, φ]} (2.1)
Where t is a year, T is the generator's lifetime, r is the discount rate, k is the
the ﬁxed cost of generator whereas µG is a running cost, φ is ﬁnancial barriers.
Financial barriers indicate among other things whether the ﬁrm has easy access
to external ﬁnance or not.
Based on the above theoretical discussions, the following empirically testable hy-
pothesis is set.
Hypothesis
Firms that invested in self-generation face higher unmitigated outage loss compared
to those that did not. Firms that invested in self-generation may continue to
suﬀer higher unmitigated outage loss compared to ﬁrms that did not invest in self-
generation. This could be possible if electricity from self-generation is not enough
to fully back up the electricity load of the ﬁrm and the ﬁrm is more vulnerable to
power outages.
3The amount of outage loss depends on the amount mitigated by adopting generator, even if
partial, and total duration of a power outage in a year (H).
4The value of λ = 0 indicates a situation where ﬁrm's operation is completely immune to
power outages and excluded in this study
5 In the absence of power interruption, the reported outage loss is assumed to be zero
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Consider two ﬁrms with an information presented above. Assume further that
output is subjected to an hourly loss of λQ. The outage loss function when a ﬁrm
invests in self-generation is given
Ls = λQ+ C
G(.)− ϕG (2.2)
where CG(.) is the cost of investing in self-generation deﬁned in equation (2.1)
The outage loss for ﬁrms without a generator is given by
Lf = θQ (2.3)
where λ and θ measure the degree to which a ﬁrm's operation is vulnerable to
power outage for a ﬁrm that invested in self-generation and that do not invested
in self-generation respectively.
Thus, ﬁrms that invested in self-generation can face higher outage loss if λ > θ i.e.
more vulnerable to power outages and the mitigating capacity of the generator is
small compared the required electricity load of the ﬁrm.
3 Methodology
3.1 Data
This study makes use of the World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) data collected
from ﬁrms operating in 13 Sub-Saharan African countries6.These countries were
selected based on sample size and the year of a survey conducted. Comparable
information using the same survey instruments across all country is available after
2010. Thus, this study considered only countries for which the survey is available
after 2010.
Combining ﬁrm level data for these countries, there are about 5,129 observations
in data set. However, there are ﬁrms that reported zero outage loss either be-
cause they are immune to outages due to the nature of their business or they have
6The study covers 13 SSA countries namely: Cameron, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mali,
Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe
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completely backed up their electricity load. In addition, ﬁrms may report unrea-
sonably large outage losses. To control for this, an upper limit of 50% is set on the
percentage of annual sales lost due to outage. After excluding these observations,
3,029 ﬁrms are left in the sample. . The sampling distribution in the data ranges
from 119 ﬁrms in Namibia and Uganda, about 4% of total sample, to 505 ﬁrms in
Nigeria which is about 17% of the sample.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Description Mean Std.Dev. Obs.
Outage time(lnH) Outage time in days/year 2.56 1.27 3029
Outage loss Percentage of sales lost due to outage 8.65 8.53 2983
lnLs Outage loss (in $/year) for adopters 13.03 4.24 1525
lnLs Outage loss (in $/year) for non-adopters 11.71 5.23 1063
PID Power intensity dummy 0.40 0.49 3029
Constraint largest obstacle to ﬁrm's doing business 0.16 0.37 3209
lnE Annual cost of electricity ( $/year) 7.16 3.35 2601
Gi Percentage of ﬁrms owning generator 0.59 0.49 3029
Gsh Share of electricity from self-generation 0.26 0.26 1730
lnL Number of permanent full time workers 3.01 1.20 3029
Age of ﬁrm Age of the ﬁrm (years) 2.51 0.70 2984
Experience (ln) Experience of the top manager (years) 2.63 0.67 2949
Ownership Percentage of ﬁrms owned by foreigners 0.20 0.40 3003
Exporters Percentage of ﬁrms engaged in export 0.14 0.35 3029
Power intensity dummy (PID) is deﬁned on the basis of average sector-level value of electricity
expenditures as a percentage of total cost. PID takes a value of one if the average sector-level
share of electricity from total annual cost is greater than median value. Obstacle to doing business
is factors that ﬁrm reported as the main constraint to doing their business. These constraints
are collapsed into two categories as electricity (1) and others factors (0) for easy interpretation.
Observation counts diﬀer due to non response and due to variable-speciﬁc cleaning procedures.
Figure 3.1 (left panel) plots the average share of ﬁrms owning generator against
the mean outage time across countries. The cross-sectional correlation between
outage time and share of ﬁrms owning generator is noisy but potentially positive
suggesting that ﬁrms in a country where there is high power problem tends to invest
in self-generation. The right panel of Figure 3.2 shows correlation between outage
time and a percentage of sale loss due to power outage. The average outage time
and the corresponding percentage of sales loss are positively correlated suggesting
that ﬁrms in a country where power outage is severe incur higher outage loss
compared to ﬁrms in a country where the problem is moderate.
Figure 3.2 shows a positive correlation between ﬁrm's power intensity, and the
share of ﬁrms owning generator in each country. This suggest that two ﬁrms
7
Figure 3.1: Outages time, share of ﬁrms owning generator and percentage of outage
loss by Country
Figure 3.2: Correlation Between Energy Intensity and Generator Ownership
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facing the same duration of power outage may have diﬀerent incentive to invest in
generator due to diﬀerence in their degree of vulnerability to power outage.
In addition to the above graphical explanations, a simple regression of power re-
lated variables on outage time and power intensity is made. The variable con-
straints in Table 2 is a dummy variable which indicates whether a ﬁrm reported
electricity as a main obstacle to doing its business or not.
Table 2: Correlation of Outages with Power variables
Dependent variable Outages(ln) [1] PID[2] Cnts[3]
Self-generation (Gow) 0.0341*** 0.121*** 0.178***
(0.006) (0.018) (0.023)
Share of self-generation (Gsh) 7.883*** 8.03*** 12.32***
(0.444) (1.254) (1.524)
The dependent variables are self-generation indicator which is a binary outcome and takes value
of one for ﬁrms owning generator, zero others, and the share of electricity from self-generation
(only for ﬁrms that adopted generator). For the purpose of estimating the correlation among
the variables, linear probability model is assumed for self-generation indicator and the usual
OLS is estimated for the later dependent variable. Figures in brackets are standard errors. ***
signiﬁcant at 1% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level ; * signiﬁcant at 10% level
The ﬁrst column of Table (2) shows ﬁrms in a country where power supply is highly
unreliable are more likely to invest in self-generation and the share of electricity
coming from self-generation is higher for these ﬁrms. Column 3 indicates ﬁrms that
report electricity as a main obstacle to doing their business more likely invests in
self-generation, and for these ﬁrms the share of electricity from self-generation is
higher compared to ﬁrms that did not report electricity as a main obstacle to doing
their business. Power intensity dummy is signiﬁcant and positively correlated with
both self-generation status and share of electricity from self-generation, suggesting
that ﬁrms operating in a power intensive sectors are more likely to invest in self-
generation and for these sectors, the share of electricity coming from self-generation
is higher compared to less power intensive sectors.
3.2 Model speciﬁcation
In this section, the empirical model is presented in line with the theoretical frame-
work discussed in section (2). The main implication of the theoretical model
discussed in section (2) is that under certain conditions, ﬁrms that expect positive
NPV will invest in self-generation and there is a resulting outage loss diﬀerential
between ﬁrms that invest in a self-generation and those that did not.
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As discussed in theoretical model, NPV measures the discounted amount of outage
loss net of investment cost, as such indicates what a ﬁrm would save by investing in
a self-generation. Revisiting discussions in section (2), this depends on outage time
and whether a ﬁrm has invested in self-generation or not, among other things. This
diﬀerential in outage loss based on investment in self-generation can be captured
by estimating the following endogenous switching regression:
Pr(Gi = 1) =β0Hi + Ziγi + ui (3.1)
Ls = β0sHi +Xsβs + εs if Gowi = 1 ≡ NPV ≥ 0 (3.2)
Lf = β0fHi +Xfβf + εf if Gowi = 0 ≡ NPV < 0 (3.3)
where equation (3.1) is a criterion (selection equation) that determines which
regime occurs, Hi is the outage time, Ls and Lf are the amount outage loss for
ﬁrms that invested in self-generation and those that do not respectively, Xs, Xf
and Zi are vectors of weakly exogenous variables; βs, βf and γi are vectors of pa-
rameters to be estimated. Assuming ui, εs and εf are normally distributed error
terms with mean zero vector and the co-variance matrix is given by:
Cov(s, f , ui) =
 δ2s δsf δsuδfs δ2f δfu
δus δuf δ
2
u
 (3.4)
where δ2u is a variance of the error term in the selection equation, δ
2
s and δ
2
f are
variances of the error terms in the continuous equations, δsu is co-variance of s
and ui, δfu is a co-variance of εf and ui
7.
The empirical speciﬁcation of the model in equation (3.1)-(3.3) are given as:
lnLs = βlnHi + β1slnE + β2slnL+ β
′
3sXi + λj + ηn + εs if Gi = 1 (3.5)
lnLf = β0f lnHi + β1f lnE + β2f lnL+ β
′
3fXi + λj+ηn + εf if Gi = 0(3.6)
Pr( Gi = 1) = β0lnHi + β1lnE + β2lnL+ β
′
3Zi + λj+ηn + ui (3.7)
7Since the dependent variables Ls and Lf are not observed simultaneously, the co-variance
between εs and εf , i.e. δsf and δfs in equation (3.4) are not deﬁned (Maddala, 1993)
10
where Zi = [ownership_i, exporter_i , lnAgei, lnExprience, PIDj],Xi=[ownership_i,
exporter_i]; lnLs and lnLf are the amount of outage loss (in USD per year) for
ﬁrms that have invested in self-generation and those that did not respectively.
lnH is log of outage time that ﬁrm i face in a year, PIDj is the power intensity
dummy for industry j, L is the number of permanent full time workers of ﬁrm i,
E is the annul expenditure on electricity of ﬁrm i, λj shows j industry dummies
which captures degree of vulnerability to power outages, ηn captures n country
dummies and ui is a normally distributed error term with mean zero and variance
of δ2u. Because of exclusion restriction imposed, managerial experience, age of ﬁrm
and power intensity dummy (PID) appear only in the selection equation. The
identiﬁcation strategy and exclusion restriction imposed is discussed more in the
next section.
The model in equations (3.5)(3.6) along with the selection equation (3.7) are es-
timated by Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) developed by (Lokshin
and Sajaia, 2004). The FIML method is more eﬃcient than the two-stage method
in estimating the endogenous switching model because it yields a consistent stan-
dard error (Fuglie and Bosch, 1995).
3.3 Identiﬁcation Strategy
For the model described above to be identiﬁed, there should be at least one variable
in the selection equation which is not included in the outage loss equations8. This
variable should aﬀects ﬁrms' decision to invest in self-generation (the selection
equation) but not directly aﬀects the outage loss. To achieve this, managerial
experience and average sector-level power intensity are included in the selection
equation. The rationale of using managerial experience as an instrumental variable
is based on the argument that the decision of whether a ﬁrm to adopt a generator or
not is mainly managerial decision which mainly depends on managerial experience
to predict the nature of power interruptions and managerial capability to exploit
ﬁrm's available resources. Since good management is aimed at reducing ﬁrm's cost
of production for a given level of output, managerial experience is expected to be
negatively correlated with generator adoption decision.
The inclusion of power intensity in the selection equation is justiﬁed in a sense that
more power intensive sectors are willing to invest in a self-generation compared
8This means there should be at least one variable in Zi in equation (3.7) which is not included
in Xi in equations (3.6)(3.6)
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less power intensive sectors, other things the same. The description of the data
in Figure (3.2) and Table (2) supports this argument ﬁrms that are more power
intensive are more likely to own generator compared ﬁrms that are less power
intensive. Taking a cue from this, to further aid the identiﬁcation, a dummy
variable indicating whether a ﬁrm is in a power intensive sector or not is computed,
and interacted with outage variable. Power intensity dummy is created based on
average sector-level electricity cost as a percentage of total cost. A sector is then,
classiﬁed as power intensive if the computed cost of electricity as a percentage of
total cost is above the median (4.8%) and non-power intensive otherwise. This is
based on the argument that power intensive sectors are heavily aﬀected by power
outages compared to sectors that are not power intensive.
3.4 Conditional Expectations, Treatment and Heterogene-
ity Eﬀects
The endogenous switching regression model in equations (3.5) and (3.6) can be used
to compare the expected outage loss between ﬁrms that invested in self-generation
and those that do not. The expected outcomes with and without self-generation
can be used to calculate the expected treatment eﬀects 9 for each group. This
can be addressed by estimating the counterfactual unmitigated outage loss level
for each group. For example, the expected outage loss with self-generation for
a sample group that actually invested in self-generation can be estimated from
data on ﬁrms in this group. The expected outage loss without self-generation for
this group is a counterfactual outcome. The same logic would describe the ac-
tual and counterfactual outcomes for the group of ﬁrms without self-generation.
The conditional expected outage loss for both group of ﬁrms under actual and
counterfactual conditions are presented in Table (3). Details on how the condi-
tional expected values under actual and counterfactual conditions, treatment and
heterogeneity eﬀects are computed for each group are available in Annex (A.1).
9Investment in self-generation is considered as voluntary treatment in which ﬁrms choose
(self-select) to invest in generator based on the anticipated gains.
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Table 3: Deﬁnition of Expected and Treatment Eﬀects
Investment Decision
Sample Invest Don't invest Treatment
Own generator E(Ls/Xs, Gi = 1) E(Lf/Xf , Gi = 1) TT
No generator E(Ls/Xs, Gi = 0) E(Lf/Xf , Gi = 0 TU
Heterogeneity Eﬀects BH1 BH2
Ls is the outage loss which ﬁrms that invested in self-generation face, Lf is the outage loss
which ﬁrms that don't invested in self-generation face, Xs is the observed control variables and
characteristics of ﬁrms that own generator, Xfis the observed control variables and character-
istics of ﬁrms that don't own generator, Gi = 1 if the ﬁrm invested in self-generation and 0
otherwise. BH1is the base heterogeneity eﬀect for ﬁrms that own generator with the counterfac-
tual that ﬁrms that don't invested in self-generation had invested in self-generation. BH2 is the
base heterogeneity eﬀect for ﬁrms that don't invested in self-generation with a counterfactual con-
dition ﬁrms that don't invested in self-generation had invested in self-generation. TTmeasures
the eﬀect of generator adoption on ﬁrms that invested in generator; this is computed by taking
the diﬀerence between the actual outage loss that these ﬁrms face and the outage loss under the
counterfactual condition that if they had not invested in generator. TUmeasures the eﬀect of
generator adoption on those ﬁrms that don't invested in a generator.
4 Results
4.1 Outage loss and investment in self-generation
For a comparison, a single-equation outage loss with no switching was estimated
with a generator ownership dummy (G) as explanatory variable and reported in
the ﬁrst column of Table (4). The coeﬃcient estimates from this model are biased
and inconsistent but are included here to compare with the switching regression
model. The coeﬃcient of generator ownership dummy (G) is positive and sig-
niﬁcant implying that ﬁrms that invested in self-generation face greater outage
loss relative to ﬁrms without such investment. This result provides a preliminary
answer to the hypothesis of the study discussed in section (3). This may be a
misleading conclusion, however, because additional endogenous eﬀect on outage
loss due to investment in self-generation have not been properly accounted for in
this simple model.
The endogenous switching regression which overcomes this problem, as speciﬁed
in 3.5-3.7, is estimated and reported in the columns 2 through 4 of Table (4) .
The switching equation, which is estimated by probit model shows the inﬂuence
of observable ﬁrm characteristics and other controls on ﬁrm's decision to invest in
self-generation. The coeﬃcient of outage time is positive and signiﬁcant, indicating
that outage time induces ﬁrms to invest in self-generation. The variable employ-
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ment is the number of permanent full-time workers and its estimated coeﬃcient is
positive and signiﬁcant. This suggests that a higher number of workers increases
the likelihood that a ﬁrm invest in self-generation. More speciﬁcally, large ﬁrms
have higher incentive to invest in self-generation compared to small ﬁrms during
a period of power outages.
The coeﬃcient of power intensity dummy (PID) is positive and signiﬁcant indi-
cating that power intensive ﬁrms have higher incentive to invest in self-generation
compared to less power intensive ﬁrms. This is mainly due to the fact that power
intensive ﬁrms need a continues supply of power.
As reported in the second column of Table (4), the estimated coeﬃcient of ﬁrm
age is positive and signiﬁcant which indicates that the likelihood that a ﬁrm invest
in self-generation increases with age of the ﬁrm. This might possibly explains the
vulnerability and ﬁnancial capacity of old ﬁrms as compared to young ﬁrms. Old
ﬁrms due to their established brand names, are more likely get access to external
ﬁnance for their operation, including investment in self-generation. On the other
hand, old ﬁrms which run many establishments suﬀer a huge outage loss for the
same outage time compared to young ﬁrms with a single or few establishments.
This may induce large ﬁrms to invest in self-generation than young ﬁrms.
The coeﬃcient of variable experience, which shows the managerial experience of
top manager of the ﬁrm, is negative and marginally signiﬁcant. This shows, ﬁrms
under the management of experienced manager have less incentive to invest in self-
generation. This could be due to the fact that motivated and experienced managers
take actions which reduces the ﬁrm's production cost because alternative source
of electricity would add more to cost for a given level of output. Similar literature
is that of Cissokho and Seck (2013); in which authors explained positive eﬀect of
power outage on ﬁrm's cost eﬃciency as a successful coping strategy. Experienced
ﬁrms organize their activities in way that could cancel the expected adverse eﬀects
of power outages. According to Scott et al. (2014) this strategies could be in the
form of shifting workers from tasks that are electricity intensive to tasks that are
less electricity demanding, or that do not need electricity or intensify production
at times when electricity is running and adapt to the realities of power availability.
Thus, the result could explains the role of improved management practices in
adapting to the electricity problem.
Next, the study turns to analysis the outage loss diﬀerential among ﬁrms that in-
vested in self-generation and those that do not, and examine the role self-generation
in mitigating the outage loss. The FIML estimates of endogenous switching re-
gression model for outage loss are reported in the third and fourth column of Table
(4). The likelihood-ratio test, reported in the last rows of Table (4), rejects the
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Table 4: Outage loss by backup-status
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null hypothesis of the equations are independent in favor of alternative hypothesis
that the model is endogenous. The estimated correlation coeﬃcient is positive
and signiﬁcant for ﬁrms that do not invested in self-generation. This indicates
investment decision and the quantity of outage loss are correlated which shows an
evidence of endogenous switching in the model.
As reported in Table (4), the coeﬃcients of determinants of outage loss are similar
in sign and signiﬁcance for both backup and non-backup10 ﬁrms, but diﬀer in mag-
nitude. This observed diﬀerences in the magnitude of estimated coeﬃcients could
be due to the presence of heterogeneity in the sample or attributed to investment
in self-generation. The identiﬁcation of the heterogeneity eﬀect in the sample and
the role investment in self-generation for both group of ﬁrms are discussed in the
following section.
The coeﬃcient of outage time is positive for both group. This shows outage loss
increases with an increase in outage time. However, the impact is stronger on a
group of ﬁrms that do not invested in self-generation. For instance, a 1% increase in
outage time increases annual outage loss for ﬁrms that invested in self-generation
by 0.37% while the same 1% increase in outage time increases the outage loss
for ﬁrms without such investment by 0.45%. This shows about 23% more than
the corresponding coeﬃcient in the outage loss equation for ﬁrms with backup
investment. This indicates ﬁrms that invested in self generation have managed,
even if partial, the eﬀect of power outages.
Similarly, outage loss increases with ﬁrm size and the amount of expenditure on
electricity for both group, however, the impact is more pronounced on ﬁrms with-
out self-generation. This also possibly explains the importance of investing in
self-generation.
4.2 Analysis of Outage Loss Diﬀerential
In this section, the study examines the extent to which investment in self-generation
has helped ﬁrms in mitigating outage loss. This can be answered by comparing
the impact of self-generation on ﬁrms that have actually invested; the eﬀect of
treatment on treated (TT ); and its impact on those that do not invested under
the condition that if they had invested in self-generation; the eﬀect of treatment
10Backup ﬁrms are those ﬁrms that have invested in self-generation while non-bank up ﬁrms
are those that don't.
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on untreated (UT ). This is reported in Table 5). The result indicates ﬁrms that
have actually invested in self-generation would have incurred a greater outage loss
if they had not invested in self generation. For instance, ﬁrms in Zambia would
have incurred additional 36% more than the current outage loss if they had not
invested in self-generation while the ﬁgure for ﬁrms in Ethiopia is about 99%. On
the other hand, ﬁrms that do not invested in self-generation would have reduced
their current outage loss by 2% to 24% if they had engaged in self generation.
This indicates the impact of self-generation is greater on ﬁrms that have actually
invested in self-generation.
Considering the observed diﬀerences in the predicted outage loss between ﬁrms
that invested in a self-generation and those that did not, ﬁrms that have invested
in self-generation have faced higher outage loss on average in all countries except
in Sudan compared to ﬁrms that did not (See Table 5). This simple comparison is,
however, misleading because it does not account for unobserved diﬀerences between
the two groups that may aﬀects outage loss. In order to account for this, the base
heterogeneity for both group is computed as speciﬁed in equations (A.7)(A.8)
and the result is reported in Table (6). With the counterfactual condition that
ﬁrms that do not invested in self-generation had invested (BH1 as indicated in
equation (A.7), the expected outage loss for ﬁrms that actually invested is higher
than the outage loss under the counterfactual condition in each country except
in Nigeria and Sudan. Firms in Nigeria and Sudan faces almost the same outage
loss under actual and counterfactual conditions indicating there is no systemic
sources of variation between the groups that could result in observable diﬀerences
in outage loss. Similarly, with the counterfactual condition that ﬁrms that have
invested in self-generation do not invested (BH2 as indicated in equation (A.8),
ﬁrms that have invested in self-generation still face higher outage loss than ﬁrms
that did not. This explains the degree to which these ﬁrms are vulnerable to power
outages and their inability to completely back-up their electricity load.
4.3 Extensions and Robustness Checks
This section asses the sensitivity of the result to the identiﬁcation assumptions.
The identiﬁcation in the previous section is based on the use of managerial experi-
ence and power intensity dummy in the investment decision equation and exclud-
ing them from the outage loss equation. To asses the validity of this assumption
and examine the sensitivity the estimates to this assumptions, the model is re-
estimated by relaxing some of the assumptions. Three alternative speciﬁcations
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Table 5: Predicted outage loss (in log of USD)
Backup Firms Non-Backup Firms
Country Actual Counter- %TT Actual Counter- %UT
(1) factual (2) (3) (4) factual (5) (6)
Cameroon 14.97 21.49 43.57 13.27 14.26 -7.43
Ethiopia 8.74 17.48 99.80 8.58 7.83 8.75
Ghana 10.94 16.76 53.10 8.26 10.03 -21.46
Kenya 15.33 22.66 47.84 13.30 14.20 -6.80
Malawi 15.58 21.36 37.04 13.30 15.09 -13.48
Namibia 11.38 16.71 46.75 8.97 11.10 -23.77
Nigeria 12.14 20.97 64.56 11.43 12.02 -5.17
Senegal 15.41 23.08 49.76 14.40 14.72 -2.23
Sudan 11.08 19.12 72.54 11.91 11.10 7.61
Tanzania 16.88 23.77 40.83 13.75 15.26 -11.04
Uganda 16.73 22.85 36.54 14.67 16.02 -9.20
Zambia 18.18 24.70 35.81 16.58 17.62 -6.27
Zimbabwe 10.72 17.19 60.28 9.00 10.27 -14.18
TT is the eﬀect of investment in self-generation on ﬁrms that have invested and obtained by
the taking the diﬀerence between column 1 & column 2, then divided by the ﬁrst column. UTis
the eﬀect of investment in self-generation on ﬁrms that didn't actually invested, computed by
taking the diﬀerence of column four and column ﬁve, then divided by column four. Both TT and
UT are expressed in percentages and TT shows the outage loss that ﬁrms that have invested in
self-generation would have incurred had they not invested compared the current unmitigated loss
given in column 1. UT shows the amount of outage loss that ﬁrms don't invested in self-generation
would have reduced had they invested in self-generation. Positive ﬁgures in UT for Ethiopia and
Sudan shows ﬁrms in these countries are better oﬀ by not investing in self-generation.
are estimated and reported in Appendix (A.2). Compared to the baseline model
reported in Table (4), the ﬁrst alternative model is estimated with managerial
experience and interaction of power intensity dummy with outage time in the in-
vestment decision model. In the second alternative speciﬁcation, in addition to the
interaction of power intensity dummy with outage time; managerial experience is
treated as categorical variable rather than continuous and industry dummies are
excluded from both investment decision and outage loss equation 11 . These cat-
egories are then included in selection equation. Finally, in the third alternative
speciﬁcation, industry dummies are excluded from both selection and outage loss
equation compared to the baseline model.
11Managerial experience is categorized into ﬁve age quintiles following (Iacovone et al., 2014).
The ﬁrst quintile 1 contains managers that have between 0 and 6 years experience, quintile 2 is
from 7 to 11 years, quintile 3 is from 12 to 16 years, quintile 4 from 17 to 26 years and quintile
5 contains managers that have more than 27 years experience
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Table 6: Predicted outage loss and heterogeneity eﬀects (in log of USD)
Backup ﬁrms Non-backup ﬁrms Heterogeneity eﬀects
Country Actual Counter- Actual Counter- BH1 BH2
(1) factual (2) (3) factual (4) (5) (6)
Cameroon 14.97 21.49 13.27 14.26 0.71 8.21
Ethiopia 8.74 17.48 8.58 7.83 0.91 8.89
Ghana 10.94 16.76 8.26 10.03 0.91 8.50
Kenya 15.33 22.66 13.30 14.20 1.12 9.36
Malawi 15.58 21.36 13.30 15.09 0.48 8.05
Namibia 11.38 16.71 8.97 11.10 0.28 7.74
Nigeria 12.14 20.97 11.43 12.02 0.11 8.54
Senegal 15.41 23.08 14.40 14.72 0.68 8.68
Sudan 11.08 19.12 11.91 11.10 -0.08 7.21
Tanzania 16.88 23.77 13.75 15.26 1.61 10.02
Uganda 16.73 22.85 14.67 16.02 0.71 8.18
Zambia 18.18 24.70 16.58 17.62 0.56 8.11
Zimbabwe 10.72 17.19 9.00 10.27 0.45 8.19
BH1 is the base heterogeneity eﬀect for backup ﬁrms with counterfactual condition that non-
backup ﬁrms had invested in self-generation, and is computed by taking diﬀerence between the
ﬁrst column and 4th column. BH2 is the base heterogeneity for non-backup ﬁrms with the
counterfactual condition that backup ﬁrms did not invested in self-generation; and is computed
by taking the diﬀerence between the second and third column.
Table (7) presents the correlation coeﬃcients between errors terms in selection and
outage loss equations under alternative speciﬁcations. The sign and signiﬁcance
of the correlation coeﬃcients are maintained under all speciﬁcations.
Under the ﬁrst alternative speciﬁcation, the coeﬃcient of interaction term, power
intensity interacted with outage time, is positive and signiﬁcant. This indicates
outages induces power intensive ﬁrms to invest more in self-generation compared
less power intensive ﬁrms. Other variables of the model have maintained their
sign and statistical signiﬁcance in both selection and outage loss equations. In all
cases, alternative speciﬁcations does insigniﬁcant changes compared to the result
from baseline speciﬁcation (see Appendix A.2A.4).
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Table 7: The Impact of Alternative Speciﬁcations on Correlation Coeﬃcients
Speciﬁcations ρ1 Std. Err. ρ2 Std. Err.
Baseline speciﬁcation -0.053 (0.092) 0.951*** (0.008)
Alternative speciﬁcation (1) -0.065 (0.093) 0.950*** (0.008)
Alternative speciﬁcation (2) -0.059 (0.091) 0.950*** (0.007)
Alternative speciﬁcation (3) -0.052 (0.087) 0.948*** (0.008)
Figures in brackets are standard errors. In alternative speciﬁcation (1), the interaction of PID with outages time
is added to the investment decision equation compared baseline speciﬁcation. Managerial experience is treated
as categorical variable and industry dummies are excluded from both selection and outage loss equations in
alternative speciﬁcation (2); while in speciﬁcation (3) only industry dummies are excluded from the outage loss
equation as compared to the baseline equation.
4.4 Why do ﬁrms that invested in self-generation face higher
outage losses?
As discussed in section (4.2), ﬁrms that invested in self-generation would have
suﬀered from 36% to 99% additional outage loss compared to the current outage
loss these ﬁrms have incurred. This shows self-generation has helped these ﬁrms
by reducing the outage loss by 36% to 99% that these ﬁrms would have suﬀered.
However, comparing the outage loss between a group of ﬁrms that invested in self-
generation and those that didn't, a group of ﬁrms that invested in self-generation
continued to face higher outage loss compared to ﬁrms without such investment.
Thus, a question that arises from such analysis is that why ﬁrms that invested in
self-generation still suﬀers higher outage losses?
This is mainly due to the fact that ﬁrms make only partial investments which can't
fully backup their electricity load. Table (A.5) shows that the share of electricity
coming from self-generation is only 9% in Sudan, and it is 11% in Cameroon.
Relatively high percentage of backup electricity is observed in Nigeria,which is
about 53%. The implication is ﬁrms may backup only critical components of their
operation due to high cost of self-generation or lack of access adequate ﬁnance. The
cost of self-generation is approximately 3 times as costly as the costs of electricity
supplied by the national grid Steinbuks and Foster (2010); Adenikinju (2003).
Firms may also opt for less than full backup investment in self-generation due to
ﬁnancial constraint. The ﬁrm may also choose backup only critical components
of their operation if the ﬁrm don't have adequate ﬁnancial capacity to invest
in complete backup. Thus, ﬁrms that have invested in self-generation remain
vulnerable to power outages.
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A Appendix
A.1 Conditional Expectations, Treatment and Heterogene-
ity Eﬀects
Considering equations in (3.5) and 3.6, the actual and counterfactual outcomes for
ﬁrms with and without self-generation is given in Table (A.1)
Table A.1: Deﬁnition of Expected and Treatment Eﬀects
Investment decision
Sample Invest Don't invest Treatment
Own generator E(Ls/Xs, Gi = 1) E(Lf/Xf , Gi = 1) TT
No generator E(Ls/Xs, Gi = 0) E(Lf/Xf , Gi = 0 TU
Heterogeneity Eﬀects BH1 BH2
Ls is the outage loss ﬁrms that invested in self-generation face, Lf is the outage loss ﬁrms that
don't invested in self-generation face, Xs is the observed control variables and characteristics of
ﬁrms that own generator, Xfis the observed control variables and characteristics of ﬁrms that
don't own generator, Gi = 1 if the ﬁrm invested in self-generation and 0 otherwise. BH1is the
base heterogeneity eﬀect for ﬁrms that own generator with the counterfactual that ﬁrms that
don't invested in self-generation had invested in self-generation. BH2 is the base heterogeneity
eﬀect for ﬁrms that don't invested in self-generation with a counterfactual condition ﬁrms that
don't invested in self-generation had invested in self-generation. TTmeasures the eﬀect of gen-
erator adoption on ﬁrms that invested in generator; this is computed by taking the diﬀerence
between the actual outage loss that these ﬁrms face and the outage loss under the counterfac-
tual condition that if they had not invested in generator. TUmeasures the eﬀect of generator
adoption on those ﬁrms that don't invested in a generator .These concepts are discussed below.
The conditional expected outage loss for both group under actual and counterfac-
tual conditions are presented in Table (A.1). These conditional expectations are
deﬁned as follows:
E(Ls/Xs , Gi = 1) = Xsβs + δsρ1
f(γZi)
F (γZi)
(A.1)
E(Lf/Xf , Gi = 0) = Xfβf + δfρ2
f(γZi)
F (γZi)
(A.2)
E(Ls/Xf ,Gi = 0) = Xfβs − δfρ2 f(γZi)
(1− F (γZi)) (A.3)
E(Lf/Xs , Gi = 1) = Xsβf − δsρ1 f(γZi)
(1− F (γZi)) (A.4)
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where F is a cumulative normal distribution function, f is a normal density dis-
tribution, ρ1 measures correlation between εs and ui, ρ2 measures correlation εf
and ui.
Equations in (A.1) and (A.2) are important to estimate the expected unmitigated
outage losses for ﬁrms that invested in self-generation and those that don't for ﬁrms
actually observed in the sample respectively, while Equations (A.3) and (A.4) are
their respective counterfactual expected unmitigated outage losses. The use of
these conditional expectations, combined with consideration of the self-generation
variable as a treatment variable, allows the estimation of the causal eﬀects of
self-generation on outage loss.
Following Heckman et al. (2001), the eﬀect of generator adoption on ﬁrms that
have actually adopted, the eﬀect of treatment on treated (TT ), is computed by
taking the diﬀerence between equation (A.1) and equation (A.4):
TT = E(Ls/Xs, Gowi = 1)− E(Lf/Xf , Gowi = 1) (A.5)
This represents the eﬀect of investing in self generation on ﬁrms' outage loss that
have actually invested in self-generation. Similarly, the eﬀect of self-generation
on ﬁrms that don't invested in self-generation, the eﬀect of treatment on the
untreated (TU) is computed by taking the diﬀerence between (A.2) and (A.3).
TU = E(Lf/Xf , Gowi = 0)− E(Ls/Xs, Gowi = 0) (A.6)
The conditional expectation in equations (A.1)-(A.4) can also be used to compute
the heterogeneity eﬀects. For instance, ﬁrms that invested in self-generation may
have faced higher outage loss than those ﬁrms that don't invested regardless of
their decision to invest in self-generation but because of the nature their business
and other ﬁrm characteristics. Adapting Carter and Milon (2005) concept of base
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heterogeneity, the eﬀect of base heterogeneity for the group of ﬁrms that invested
in self-generation is computed by taking the diﬀerence between equation in (A.1)
and (A.3)
BH1 = E(Ls/Xs, Gi = 1)− E(Ls/Xs, G = 0) (A.7)
Similarly, for those ﬁrms that don't invested in self-generation, the eﬀect of base
heterogeneity is the diﬀerence between equation (A.2) and (A.4)
BH2 = E(Lf/Xf , Gi = 0)− E(Lf/Xf , Gi = 1) (A.8)
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A.2 Alternative speciﬁcations for switching regression
Table A.2: Alternativee Speciﬁcation 1
Adoption decision Adopters Non-adopters
Variable Coef. Std.err Coef. Std.err Coef. Std.err
Outages(ln) 0.0203 0.027 0.366*** 0.075 0.446*** 0.112
Employment(ln) 0.386*** 0.033 0.818*** 0.091 2.17*** 0.151
Elec. expend.(ln) 0.047*** 0.015 0.229*** 0.038 0.569*** 0.070
Export 0.009 0.092 0.482** 0.215 0.684* 0.417
Ownership 0.189** 0.084 0.079 0.207 0.618* 0.381
Experience (ln) -0.068* 0.037
Af (ln) 0.087*** 0.035
PID*Outages(ln) 0.064*** 0.016
Constant -0.631** 0.232 6.82*** 0.629 5.64*** 0.930
ρ1 -0.065 0.093
ρ2 0.950*** 0.008
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number Obs. 2237
Log likelihood -6796
Wald χ2(17) 1335 Prob >χ2 = 0.000
LR test of independent equations: χ2(1) = 831 Prob >χ2 = 0.000
PIDis the power intensity dummy, which takes value of one if the average industry -level power
intensity is greater than the median value and zero other wise. In this speciﬁcation, in addition
to managerial experience, identiﬁcation is achieved by the inclusion of the interaction term
PIDlnoutages which is the interaction of power intensity indicator and the outage time.
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Table A.3: Alternative Speciﬁcation 2
Adoption decision Adopters Non-adopters
Variable Coef. Std.err Coef. Std.err Coef. Std.err
Outages(ln) 0.025 0.027 0.360*** 0.074 0.459*** 0.110
Employment(ln) 0.387*** 0.032 0.834*** 0.090 2.18*** 0.148
Elec. expend.(ln) 0.050*** 0.015 0.226*** 0.037 0.550*** 0.068
Export 0.004 0.090 0.493** 0.212 0.811** 0.417
Ownership 0.178** 0.205 0.079 0.207 0.487* 0.371
Expc2 -0.157*** 0.066
Expc3 -0.151** 0.069
Expc4 -0.166*** 0.068
Expc5 -0.178** 0.078
Age(ln) 0.071** 0.034
PIDOutagesln 0.058*** 0.015
Constant -0.538** 0.202 6.27*** 0.529 5.98*** 0.818
ρ1 -0.059 0.091
ρ2 0.950*** 0.007
Industry dummies No No No
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number Obs. 2291
Log likelihood -6867
Wald χ2(17) 1356 Prob >χ2 = 0.000
LR test of independent equations: χ2(1) = 612 Prob >χ2 = 0.000
PIDis the power intensity dummy, which takes value of one if the average industry level power
intensity is greater than the median value and zero other wise. In this speciﬁcation; estimation
is made without industry dummies, experience in categories and PID interaction with outages
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Table A.4: Alternative Speciﬁcation 3
Adoption decision Adopters Non-adopters
Variable Coef. Std.err Coef. Std.err Coef. Std.err
Outages(ln) 0.057** 0.025 0.312*** 0.073 0.522*** 0.113
Employment (ln) 0.430*** 0.027 1.066*** 0.083 2.905*** 0.133
Export 0.052 0.086 0.373* 0.215 0.712* 0.422
Ownership 0.112 0.084 0.252 0.200 0.691* 0.376
Experience (ln) -0.049 0.035
Age(ln) 0.064** 0.031
PID 0.205*** 0.042
Constant -0.257 0.163 8.032*** 0.416 9.986*** 0.676
ρ1 -0.052 0.087
ρ2 0.948*** 0.008
Industry dummies No No No
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number Obs. 2466
Log likelihood -7512
Wald χ2(16) 1394 Prob >χ2 = 0.000
LR test of independent equations: χ2(1) = 1154 Prob >χ2 = 0.000
Compared to the third speciﬁcation, industry dummies are excluded from both adoption decision
equation and the outage loss equations. Identiﬁcation is achieved through the inclusion of PID
and Experience in decision equation.
Table A.5: Percentage of electricity coming from self-generation
Share of electricity from self-generation
Country Mean Gsh (%) Sdt.Dev.
Cameroon 11.12 9.62
Ethiopia 21.94 24.78
Ghana 18.04 12.56
Kenya 13.30 13.54
Malawi 20.02 19.61
Namibia 21.09 20.53
Nigeria 53.79 27.40
Senegal 12.71 17.13
Sudan 9.31 14.27
Tanzania 22.45 13.11
Uganda 14.76 18.96
Zimbabwe 19.96 22.70
Share of electricity coming from self-generation is computed as the ration of electricity from self-generation to
total electricity load of the ﬁrm.
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